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This paper continues a conversation about Wittgenstein’s picture of language and meaning and its 
potential applications for educational theorising. It takes the form of a response to Wolff-Michael 
Roth’s earlier paper “Heeding Wittgenstein on “understanding” and “meaning”: A pragmatist 
and concrete human psychological approach in/for education,” in which Roth problematizes the 
use of the terms “understanding” and “meaning” in education discourse and proposes their 
abandonment. Whilst we agree with Roth about a series of central points, at the same time we 
maintain that he has taken his argument in directions antithetical to our reading of Wittgenstein’s 
work. We offer four points of departure, exploring themes of: (i) appropriate questioning; (ii) 
eliminativism; (iii) language-games and grammar; and (iv) ‘productivity,’ explanation, and a 
science of learning. We conclude by discussing ways consistent with Wittgenstein’s thought to go 
on in thinking about education. 
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All this, however, can only appear in the right light when one has attained greater clarity 
about the concepts of understanding, meaning, and thinking. For it will then also become 
clear what can lead us (and what did lead me) to think that if anyone utters a sentence and 
means or understands it he is operating a calculus according to definite rules. (PI §81; See 
‘References’ section for standard abbreviations for Wittgenstein’s works; the standard 
symbol “§” identifies numbered passages.) 
 
But if you say: “How am I to know what he means, when I see nothing but the signs he 
gives?” then I say: “How is he to know what he means, when he has nothing but the signs 
either?” (PI §504) 
 
Without question philosophy and other disciplines have been troubled by – and have 
troubled – the notion of ‘understanding’ as a mental state or process, and the notion of 
‘meaning.’ In his recent paper in this journal, Wolff-Michael Roth (2015) takes up the 
challenge of what to do with the signs, “meaning” and “understanding,” in order to 
promote further progress in education research and practice, particularly in science 
education. Roth articulates that his purpose “is to stimulate a discussion about abandoning 
these terms from the theoretical discourse of education” (p. 26). We thank Roth for his 
thoughtful analysis, and in this response paper we take up his invitation to continue the 
discussion. 
 
Although “understanding” and “meaning” appear central to most discussions in (science) 
education, Roth’s concern is that the use of these terms invariably steer perception toward 
an individualized view of learning and the mind, and an accompanying representational, 
metaphysical view of language separated from its use within specific concrete practices. 
Such a viewpoint, Roth argues, is “primitive” (citing Wittgenstein), lacks cogency, and, in 
the end, is unsuited to an “increasingly connected world constituted by (digitally 
sustained) relations with others” (p. 49). 
 
Roth’s response is radical and provocative. He sets out what might best be described as an 
eliminativist argument for removing these signs from use in education, doing so primarily 
by “heeding” Wittgenstein, in addition to other thinkers. Roth’s goal is to develop what he 
calls a “pragmatic approach” to learning, that is, an approach that focuses on “concrete, 
public facts and societal relations” leading to the development of a “concrete human 
psychology and sociology” (p. 49). He argues for a “scientific discipline of education” that 
theorizes about “language-in-use” and that establishes “approaches consistent with 
concrete human psychology” (p. 42). His article contains a series of examples of 
scientific-oriented discourses set in schools and research laboratories in which he seeks to 
demonstrate how such practices can be narrated and analysed without recourse to either 
“understanding” or “meaning.”  
 
In an accompanying editorial, Pernille Hviid (2016) questions the basis upon which 
mainstream terms such as “meaning” and “understanding” should be deleted and, recalling 
Leontjev, raises potential loss of distinction between the personal and collective with the 
removal of these terms. Hviid concludes her editorial comments on Roth by asking: “how 
harmful is it really to go on speaking in terms of meaning and understanding in education 
discourse, just like we continue to speak of the “sun setting”?” (p. 2). The broader 
question here is what is lost and/or gained through predetermined acts of erasure in what 
we might call the body of organic, specific language-games in dynamic play in concrete 
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situations? What is desirable and not? In what follows, we return to the specific example 
of talk of the sun setting, drawing on what we perceive as an important distinction that 
Wittgenstein makes between language-games and grammar.  
 
Roth develops his arguments by drawing extensively on (the later) Wittgenstein. At key 
points in Roth’s argument, Wittgenstein is called upon in a series of theoretical moves to 
support the idea of the superfluous, redundant nature of understanding and meaning and to 
shift educational discourses away from notions that privatize experience. In what follows, 
we respond to the original article by offering a different reading of Wittgenstein. Although 
we agree with Roth on a number of central points, at the same time we maintain that he 
has taken his argument in directions antithetical to our reading of Wittgenstein’s work. 
Whilst provocative, he has gone too far in calling for an eliminativist solution to settle any 
unease or vexation we might have with the two terms in question. We think such an 
eliminativist approach is certainly beyond, if not opposed, to what Wittgenstein himself 
advocated, particularly in his later writings. In response, we raise and discuss some 
alternative considerations of what it might mean to “heed Wittgenstein” – using Roth’s 
phrase – within educational research and practice. 
 
Our response holds tight to Roth’s employment of certain aspects of (the later) 
Wittgenstein’s picture of language and meaning, though, of course, there are other angles 
to pursue here. Alternatively, and perhaps most obviously, Roth’s use of some of 
Vygotsky’s ideas calls for closer scrutiny. In our response we have taken up this angle 
only as far as to consider Roth’s Marxist take – through Vygotsky – on Wittgenstein’s 
picture of language-games. As well, more can be made of Roth’s take on pragmatism, in 
which he plays out a kind of complicated mutuality between eliminativism and 
pragmatism, though whether his is Rorty’s pragmatism or the pragmatism of Peirce, 
James, and Dewey is something we think needs further discussion. Certainly the idea of 
consequences is part of what Wittgenstein considers in working out his picture of 
language – indeed, it is in the ongoing ‘flow’ of things that meaning operates (e.g., see 
Z§§ 135, 173, 238; RFM VI §41). Finally, the issue of behaviorism in Wittgenstein and in 
Roth’s paper might profitably be raised and discussed. However this is a tricky topic, and 
for that reason we veer away from introducing it in this first response to Roth’s argument.  
 
Learning as participation in concrete contexts 
We are sympathetic to a cultural pragmatist view of language and learning. The picture we 
advocate is that in speaking we are not somehow reverting to something independent of 
the signs we use, a ‘something’ outside of language that guides, grounds, and confirms our 
(right) use of signs, but rather that it is performance within language – and the context and 
circumstances of speakers – that is central. As Wittgenstein says, “it is in language that 
it’s all done” (PG §95). Roth says in this regard that, “the pragmatist position on language-
in-use described here allows us – in fact requires us – to drop the idea of language as a 
means to make present again (re-present) whatever appears on the inside of a person” (p. 
43). This very much reminds us of the keen insights developed so successfully by the 
noted Canadian Wittgenstein scholar, J.F.M. Hunter (1973) that, “it is not by examining 
and interpreting what happened [i.e., happened ‘inside one’], but by doing more of the 
same, that one says what one thought” (p. 101). We take this to be Roth’s main point, to 
Heeding grammar and language games •   37 
 
OUTLINES - CRITICAL PRACTICE STUDIES • Vol. 21, No. 1 • 2020 
www.outlines.dk 
the effect that, “it is not the “meaning” or “understanding” of a statement that matters but 
its role as a move in the game” (p. 41). 
The focus here is the real talk of interlocutors in real situations, a focus we see in many of 
Roth’s other works (including his important book, Designing communities, (1998)). And 
his emphasis on ‘concrete’ social relations as at the center of this picture of language and 
meaning seems to us, in general terms, to be generative, far-reaching, and fruitful. 
We read Roth’s statements early in his paper concerning the integral interweaving of signs 
with actions as accurately following Wittgenstein. What a word ‘means’ is how I go on 
with it, what I do – verbally and nonverbally – when I hear or speak that sign. This is 
certainly part of the core of what emerges from PI §2, for example. Roth says, linking all 
of this to the notion of the ‘language-game,’ that “Wittgenstein actually erases the 
distinction between knowing our ways around the world generally and knowing a 
language appropriate for the specific situations … because knowing the language of 
building and acting appropriately in the common activity of building a house … has 
become the same” (p. 35). He goes on to say in this regard that, “we must not just compare 
the words and how these are assembled into statements, but the associated activities, the 
specific instruments and objects involved, the division of labor, the particular public 
arenas in which the game takes place …” (p. 36). We find these points from Roth’s paper 
most convivial to our own thinking about Wittgenstein. In what follows, we now focus on 
four significant points in which we appear to differ. 
 
Responding to Roth’s argument 
Asking appropriate questions 
Our approach to the question of how we can best address the use of such signs as 
“meaning” and “understanding” is quite different from that taken by Roth. In our view, it 
is clear that Wittgenstein does not want to rid language (and by extension, the language of 
education) of these signs, but rather to cut off at the root the kind of talk that leads us to 
ask ‘inappropriate’ questions of these signs, which would in turn lead us onto paths that 
involve us in the misuse of them.1 Indeed, the first part of the Investigations (to PI §21, 
and perhaps up to PI §43) has as a main project developing an argument to head off 
certain kinds of inquiry into – or theorizing about – language and meaning. This is as well 
how Wittgenstein opens the discussion in The Blue and Brown Books, pointing out that by 
asking, “what is the meaning of a word?” we are led by analogical resemblance to other 
questions to seek a substantive, and by doing so experience ‘mental cramp.’ Wittgenstein 
says: 
The questions “What is length?”, “What is meaning?” “What is the number one?” etc., 
produce in us a mental cramp. We feel that we can’t point to anything in reply to them and 
yet ought to point to something. (We are up against one of the great sources of 
philosophical bewilderment: a substantive makes us look for a thing that corresponds to 
it). (BB, p. 1) 
 
In our view, Roth’s eliminativist argument is based precisely on the attempt to look for 
just such “a thing” in the cases of “meaning” and “understanding,” and, not finding it, he 
 
 
1 We follow the important work of Warren Goldfarb (1983; 1992), for example, in this. 
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thus resolves to change our language by abandoning these signs altogether.2 The need to 
head off of these kinds of inquiries is emphasized by Wittgenstein at many places: e.g., 
see: “The mistake is to say that there is anything that meaning something consists in” (Z 
§16). 
 
It would be Wittgenstein’s course to interrupt Roth in his talk about language and the 
particular problems concerning the denotation of certain specific signs. To have gone this 
far is already to have gone a step too far, i.e., to have set up problems concerning 
denotation for our understanding of language, and we think that in his reaction to these 
problems Roth develops a position at odds with Wittgenstein. We note, however, that it 
may be fairer to read Roth here as simply defending an independently developed position 
from possible objections. At any rate, from here Roth’s discussion moves into talk about 
‘production’ and ‘productive activity,’ of content and intelligibility, and from these into 
the need for different kinds of explanatory accounts of what we in fact say in concrete 
situations, all as prolegomena to effect a science of learning. The necessary, early 
casualties of Roth’s argument are certain signs which need to be dropped from use. 
 
Eliminativism  
Quite apart from what Wittgenstein had to say about the matter, we note two concerns 
with eliminativist arguments of the sort proposed. First, it is difficult to remain consistent 
with one’s eliminativist principles once you start. Even though Roth is purportedly 
abandoning mental constructs such as ‘understanding,’ his own paper still employs a range 
of similar kinds of terms, all of which, presumably, ‘denote’ problematic ‘metaphysical’ 
states, processes, or entities. For example, Roth says such things as: 
 
 “… is followed by changes on the monitor that all those present know to be the 
results of shifting the two graphs …” (p. 38); 
“… is followed by an action that others perceive to be taking a scan …” (p. 40);  
“… so that what we recognize to be the same noise-word …” (p. 42); 
 
Our point is that “know” and “perceive” in the first two statements evidently enough stand 
for something like “understand”, and “recognize” in the third sentence is something more 
than a mere reaction to stimulus. Perhaps this serves as illustration of how difficult it is to 
narrate a view of language that so sharply contrasts with the mainstream. Educational 
language is historically set up to describe and promulgate the individual mind. 
 
Second, it is difficult to stop an eliminativist approach once you have started eliminating 
things. One starts with “meaning” and “understanding,” then moves on to other 
‘denotation-troubled’ signs like “thinking/thought,” “belief,” “idea,” perhaps “judgment,” 
“hope” – indeed, most psychological-type terms. For example, in Roth (2016), terms such 
as “(mental) schema,” “mental structures,” “constructions,” and “(mental) 
representations,” along with “meaning” and “conceptions” are similarly cast into the 
“metaphysical realm” (see p. x). Likewise, how long can various signs such as “same,” 
 
 
2 See also Lundegärd & Hamza (2014) for an interesting take on the problem of ‘seeking substantives.’ For 
Lundegärd & Hamza, “Wittgenstein … describes how our observations of everyday actions have led to our 
talking about underlying entities” (p. 140), where these entities underlie or regulate action.    
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“different,” “quality,” and signs like “quark,” “gravity,” “light waves,” “justice,” “God,” 
“democracy,” etc., hold out from being discarded, or at least consigned to interminable 
debate as to the realities of their denotated referents? Roth (2015) himself does explicitly 
eject from use “concepts” along with “understanding” and “meaning” (see p. 27), and as 
well indicates problems of denotation infecting signs like “the,” “for,” etc. (see p. 33). 
And are the connexions Wittgenstein himself indicates tying “understanding,” for 
example, to many other key signs/concepts (e.g., “can,” “is able to,” “know”) tight enough 
for these in turn to be similarly imperiled by Roth’s eliminativist programme (e.g., see PI 
§§150-151)? 
 
Now to Wittgenstein, who was quite explicit not only that we not change language in our 
investigations (e.g., “Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; 
it can in the end only describe it. … It leaves everything as it is” PI §124), but that our 
only cogent and appropriate task is to get a clearer view on how we use signs (like 
“understanding” and “meaning”). For example, Wittgenstein says: “In order to get clearer 
about the grammar of the word “understand”, let’s ask: When do we understand a 
sentence? – When we’ve uttered the whole of it? Or while uttering it?” (PG §12). In 
distinction to Roth’s program of eliminativism, Wittgenstein recommends instead the 
rehabilitation of words: “What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to 
their everyday use” (PI §116). This signifies a very different response than to changing 
our language. 
 
Moreover, it is a difficult eliminativist argument that holds (1) it is how signs get used by 
speakers that is the important thing about language, but (2) at the same time we can 
discard certain signs by virtue of problems with their denotations. In saying this we are 
not, of course, advocating a simple and straightforward ‘meaning is use’ equation here, 
matters being far more complicated than this in Wittgenstein’s picture of language and 
meaning. As Roth argues, “the theoretical and empirical discourses of (science) education 
are populated with the terms “understanding” and “meaning.” Whatever these terms 
denote, however, is elusive and not available in language itself” (p. 42 – and see again 
Wittgenstein’s comment at PG §95, quoted above). This of course would be a problem for 
all signs, at least for all signs that purportedly denote or designate something, if we take 
up a denotation perspective on meaning. But more importantly, how justifiable is it to 
argue for (1) and at the same time import (2) to eliminate specific troublesome signs 
which are considered troublesome only in terms of denotation? If particular signs have to 
be abandoned, the argument for their abandonment would logically have to be made in 
terms of problems with their use, in the context of Roth’s argument here. Is it justifiable to 
use the theory that is in the course of being rejected in order to promote the alternative 
theory (or ‘picture’) being adopted? Problems with a theory can provide reasons to drop it; 
but by having switched to a ‘use’ picture of language and meaning, one has ipso facto 
already abandoned referential/denotational theory of meaning, and so can no longer use it 
(at least not in the way Roth uses it, viz., to warrant abandoning two particular signs). 
We turn next to consider Roth’s understanding of ‘language-games,’ and then to the 
connection Roth makes between language-games and what he calls “productivity,” and 
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‘Language-games’ and ‘grammar’ 
In the picture of language and meaning drawn by Wittgenstein, the parts called “language-
games,” “grammar,” and “rules” are central, though Wittgenstein almost coyly resists 
setting these out in definitive terms (e.g., see PI §65). They are not theoretical terms, after 
all, in the spirit of David Lewis (1970) or Carl Hempel (1965), for instance, but rather are 
different though interconnected ways to picture language.3 What does seem reasonably 
clear is that the notion of ‘language-games’ pictures the motile force in language, i.e., that 
which, when played, takes us from sign to sign (in a broad sense); that ‘grammar’ is a 
matter of the loose and flexible set of connexions any sign has with other signs, 
connexions and paths which have been blazed out through histories of playing a range of 
language-games with signs; and ‘rules’ the normative aspect of playing specific language-
games with specific signs. Again, we recognize that this is a much-oversimplified 
drawing; indeed, as Wittgenstein alerts his reader, “in fact we do the most various things 
with our sentences” (PI §27). 
 
Wittgenstein provides many particular examples of language-games throughout his later 
writings, too numerous to enumerate here. In PI §§23, 25, however, Wittgenstein gives us 
a clue as to what he is trying to get us to picture with the notion of ‘language-games’: they 
are activities like “forming and testing a hypothesis … guessing riddles … asking, 
thanking, cursing, greeting, praying” and “commanding, questioning, recounting …”. 
In view of this, from our perspective we observe Roth first calling a too-wide range of 
‘activities’ “language-games,” and claiming that scientists play different language-games 
from non-scientists (e.g., see pp. 37-38). Of course, scientists are often engaged in 
activities that most of us aren’t. Most of us do not use high-powered microscopes, for 
instance, and do not have the technical skills to work such instruments, nor have mastery 
of the relevant technical vocabularies. But this does not entail that the language-games in 
play are different. For example, in analyzing a sample of the dialogue of a small group of 
scientists, Roth says that their “game is about making the light fall through the 
photoreceptor cell” (p. 38). Here we suggest that this is not a good example of a language-
game; it is better narrated as one activity in the course of which the participants will ask 
questions, make observational remarks, give orders, etc., and these, intermixed with the 
nonverbal actions, we would contend, are language-games. In other words, the language-
games played by scientists are to a large degree the same games played by the rest of us 
(i.e., “commanding, questioning, recounting …”). The difference is that scientists play 
these games with ranges of signs and connexions between signs radically unfamiliar to 
most of us. Of course, a lot of science is done in the language of various maths, and these 
would be language-games that most of us would not know how to play. But that doesn’t 
seem to be Roth’s point. 
 
Here we caution against calling overarching contexts, goals, or activities “language-
games,” and instead see these as composed of many players in many particular situations 
playing multiple language-games and oriented around innumerable, varying pictures. 
Thus, for example, Roth says things like, “… the language-game played is schooling …” 
 
 
3 For example, see Hempel (1965): “Theoretical terms … usually purport to refer to not directly observable 
entities and their characteristics; they function … in scientific theories intended to explain empirical 
generalizations” (p. 179); and see Lewis (1970), who says that a theoretical term is “introduced by a given 
theory T at a given stage in the history of science” (p. 428). 
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(p. 44), and that the game played by the scientists in his analyses lies “within the larger 
game named to be “production of scientific knowledge”” (pp. 40-41), and that the 
language scientists use “is for accomplishing a particular move in the overall language-
game “the production of scientific knowledge”” (p. 41). 
 
Second, what strikes us in these discussions is the conflation between what gets talked 
about with the ways (i.e., language-games) in which what gets talked about gets talked 
about, as one way of putting this. Our feeling, in other words, is that Roth’s arguments 
could be further strengthened and nuanced by making more of Wittgenstein’s notion of 
‘grammar,’ and thus diffusing the confusion between content and the ways (i.e., language-
games) in which we use, or move between, signs. 
 
This confusion can be seen in the several short analyses Roth offers which he intends to 
illustrate the application of his pragmatic and concrete science of learning; it is a 
confusion we think can be removed by getting a clearer view of Wittgenstein’s picture of 
language-games and by closer attention to the picture of grammar. These mini-analyses 
consider: (1) the difference between an astronomer’s professional ‘scientific’ talk in the 
observatory and their day-to-day talk with their young son (pp. 43-44); (2) science 
students learning to use the signs “entropy” and “enthalpy” (p. 44); and (3) science 
students learning new words and phrases in general (p. 48). The basic aim of these 
analyses is to show that, “rather than considering students’ inappropriate (“poor”) 
“understanding” or “misplaced meanings,” the pragmatic approaches leads us to describe 
and explain the kind of language-games that they participate in. The ones most commonly 
played are different from those of scientists, though many aspects (like words) appear in 
both” (p. 43). In terms of the case of the astronomer and her son, Roth comments: 
 
We do not find it surprising, therefore, that an astronomer points out to her son the 
marvelous spectacle of a sunrise or sunset – even though at work she would never speak 
about the sun as moving (setting, rising). At the instant that she and her son look at the 
rising or setting sun, they are playing a game different from that played in the 
astronomical observatory, where the very entities invoked (here celestial bodies) tend to be 
different. (pp. 43-44) 
 
Our alternate reading is that while astronomer and son talk about things differently, they 
are not for that playing different language-games. As well, is it clear, as Roth notes, that 
the difference here in language-games is a matter of the difference in actual entities 
“invoked” by the signs in question? The astronomer’s son is familiar with one grammar of 
the sign “sun”; the astronomer, while familiar with that grammar, is also familiar with 
other grammars (e.g., that “sun” – and “earth,” “planets,” etc. – are connected to “regular 
orbits”) with which the son is not familiar. We might also say that this astronomer is 
familiar with – or is accountable for – a more extended grammar of “sun,” at least relative 




4 We note here, however, the problematic way of talking about “one grammar” or “other grammars,” though 
we are not quite sure yet just how to talk about these parts of the picture of language without such 
awkwardness. 
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In connection to Richard Rorty’s pragmatism, Roth notes that “… what we recognize to be 
the same noise-word – e.g., “force,” “heat,” or “velocity” – actually have different, for 
students generally unfamiliar uses when they come to school and science class” (p. 42). 
This comes across to us as a beginning to taking up that angle of Wittgenstein’s picture 
that concerns what he calls “grammar”. 
 
We consider in a similar way the second case Roth analyzes, viz., about science students 
learning new terms. He writes: 
 
New words afford the changing of old and the playing of new games, not just the naming 
of things unknown before, such as when physics students encounter words such as 
“entropy” or “enthalpy,” which enrich the language-games (not just language!) that can be 
played while talking about the transformations (changes of state) of physical systems. (p. 
44)5 
 
So, what does happen when a student encounters for the first time a new sign or word like 
“entropy” or “enthalpy”? A variety of circumstances can characterize such first 
encounters, but likely a text or an authoritative person uses the sign in some way, in some 
form of a sentence, and in doing so shows the student how that one sign connects to 
particular other signs. See, for example, this passage from an elementary school book, 
Science 5, (2008), from the Ontario school board: 
 
There are many forms of energy that can be used to do work: … Heat – energy of the 
particles in an object. This is sometimes called thermal energy. The faster the particles 
move, the more heat energy the object has. (p. 141) 
 
A student learning science and reading the sign, “thermal energy,” for the first time in just 
this passage, is introduced to connexions between the signs “heat,” “energy,” “doing 
work,” “particles,” “motion/movement,” and the new sign, “thermal energy.” But there are 
in all likelihood no new language-games the student is being shown here; nothing is 
unfamiliar in this passage except for the way these signs are connected to one another, 
which is the grammar of the signs. And that is what the student reading this passage is 
being offered for their learning – i.e., for them, a new and expanded (and perhaps 
corrected) grammar weaving together various signs. Thus, contra Roth, our reading is that 
learning a new word in a science education class is not best pictured through accounts of 
changing old language-games and/or learning new language-games. A student learns how 
to use a new word by playing with it language-games already mastered, including 
language-games having to do with inquiry, assertion, stating causal relations, naming, 
explaining, doubting, etc. Further, when we are originally introduced to a language-game 
as a novice, it is not in the first instance a cognitive matter of ‘grasping’ a new thing, but, 
again, is rather a matter of being-shown-how-to-play-it which, at the same time, is a 
learning how to use (new) words. We learn how to use new words by actually playing 
various language-games with them, and, initially, at least, we learn how to play new 
language-games by being shown how to play them with specific words. Being-shown-
 
 
5 We wonder whether Roth means for us to consider his claim here in light of something like Wittgenstein’s 
claim at OC §65: “When language-games change, then there is a change in concepts, and with the concepts 
the meanings of words change.” 
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how-to-play a language-game has inherent to it a normative aspect or sensibility 
(following Ginsborg, 2011, for example), rather than a rational or syllogistic – or 
automatic – structure to the learning. 
 
‘Productivity,’ explanation, and a science of learning  
Roth’s paper has a central concern with ‘production’ and ‘scientific explanation’. This 
concern moves Roth’s argument from Wittgenstein’s ‘grammatical,’ or ‘conceptual,’ 
investigations, to the explanatory and the practical, and from these in the subsequent move 
to (pragmatic, concrete) science. Roth’s governing concern is in having a science of 
education, and thus his argument works around this interest: “A scientific discipline of 
education would want to rid its theoretical language of such terms [i.e., “meaning” and 
“understanding”]” (p. 28). We read this particular interest as shaping Roth’s heeding and 
use of Wittgenstein. 
 
However, this evidently was not Wittgenstein’s aim, and while Wittgenstein’s anti-
theoretical and anti-explanatory pronouncements concerning language have frustrated 
commentators, they are clearly enough made. Wittgenstein says this in many ways in 
many different passages. For example, in the ‘therapeutic’ section of the Investigations 
(i.e., PI §§89-133), he says that, “It was true to say that our considerations could not be 
scientific ones. … And we may not advance any kind of theory. There must not be 
anything hypothetical in our considerations. We must do away with all explanation, and 
description alone must take its place” (PI §109). Near the end of the Investigations, he 
says that, “the question is not one of explaining a language-game by means of our 
experiences, but of noting a language-game” (PI §655; see also §654). Finally, 
“grammar,” Wittgenstein says, “only describes and in no way explains the use of signs” 
(PI §496). 
 
Roth’s deferral to Marx on the centrality of ‘production’ seems key in understanding the 
kind of account advocated, and indeed, we think it helps open the way for Roth to 
introduce theory and explanation as aspects pertinent to the picture of language and 
meaning drawn by Wittgenstein. Roth says in this regard that, “Marx … writes that the 
production of ideas, representations, and consciousness is directly tied into the production 
of material life and into the material relations of people, the language of real life. That is, 
the production of everyday life, language, and consciousness are irreducible” (p. 46). With 
this kind of impetus it is clearer to see how Roth is moved to say such things as: “Do we 
require “meaning” as a theoretical concept for describing and explaining what is 
happening here [i.e., in a bit of dialogue from the first excerpt]? … The language-game 
played is about producing a description and an explanation of what happened when 
crayons were placed in the aquarium” (p. 34), and to be concerned with “the use of 
language in the production of life and societal relations” (p. 48). Finally in this regard, we 
mark Roth’s enthusiasm to “enact the real program Vygotskij described … which aspires 
to explain individual and collective functioning of human beings …” (p. 48). Despite his 
taking up of Vygotsky, we note that Roth in this paper tries to move beyond analysis in 
terms of complex, mediating activity between subject and object, to analysis focused on 
the complex activity between subjects. 
 
Our unease with this developing argument is the move from a grammatical or conceptual 
perspective to a causal/hypothetical and practical perspective, i.e., from setting out a 
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conceptual framework and on that basis then setting out a theoretical framework. For 
instance, Roth says, “it [i.e., Roth’s own ‘pragmatist perspective’] changes the ways in 
which we describe knowing and learning; and it changes the ways in which we have to 
consider and plan for learning experiences” (p. 48; emphasis ours). From this perspective, 
Wittgenstein’s picture of the ‘language-game’ seems transformed and is turned to use as a 
theoretical term in a (new) explanatory theory concerning a pragmatism of learning (and 
thus “language-game” names – or denotes? – a hypothetical entity of some kind). Hunter 
(1985), on the other hand, provides the needed corrective here, encouraging a reading of 
Wittgenstein that disentangles the productive (i.e., causal accounts) from the ‘knowing-
how’: “… we should not confuse the question whether a person can do something, with 
the question how it is that he can.” (p. 70) 
 
Roth’s production-oriented account moves from description and grammatical investigation 
to doing scientific investigation, that is, to building a theory to account in causal terms for 
what we say, i.e., to explain how certain utterances are produced via the theoretical 
machinery of language-games. Perhaps by these means it is possible to abandon signs like 
“meaning” and “understanding,” but it is at the cost of slipping into what Wittgenstein 
calls a “fly-bottle” (e.g., see PI §309), viz., a philosophical trap in which one is beguiled 
and bewitched by the misuse of language (see PI §109). Needless to say, this is precisely 
the kind of course that Wittgenstein tries to discourage from even beginning. Further, we 
think the distance between Marx, even as filtered through Vygotsky, and Wittgenstein, is 
large enough to require very careful handling in reading Wittgenstein from a Marxist 
perspective. 
 
Another way to consider the product – or the achievement – of a process as the main 
thing, is that in taking up this perspective we open our inquiry and talk both to protocols 
of strict measurement and assessment of that produced achievement and to how that 
achievement was produced (i.e., by looking to the causal surround of the utterance). When 
we focus instead on the process itself without regard for what it ‘produces,’ then, we 
think, we are closer to Wittgenstein’s picture. We consider rather the quality of the 
process, how the moments and moves that comprise it link together, their fecundity in 
making possible next moves; in other words, we consider what language-games are played 
and how they are played, and how these make for movement between signs. Perhaps we 
describe also the kinds of trainings and experiences and practices that make for the 
background circumstances to someone’s abilities to go on in these ways, which is not to 
provide a causal accounting, but rather to set out (when needed) the ‘grammatical 
circumstances’ of utterances made. There is an openness to process, and to its situation in 
a variety of circumstances and contexts, that make it difficult – impossibly difficult, given 
Wittgenstein’s picture – to render clear judgments as to products, outcomes, 
achievements. Rather, knowing how to go on, to continue going on with the talk, is what 
we have. “Have you got it?” is, in a sense, a representationalist way of picturing 
understanding; “Do you know how to go on from here?” is a way of picturing 
understanding in processual terms. In the first we assess a concrete outcome; in the second 
we assess a ‘knowing-how’ ability, i.e., an ability to take part in the flow of (more or less 
acceptable) talk and action and doing. For example, Wittgenstein says: “Conversation 
flows on … and only in its course do words have meaning” (Z §§135); and that, “only in 
the stream of thought and life do words have meaning” (Z §173). “How well is the game 
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played?” might be our key question, taking our lead from Wittgenstein; for Roth, it seems, 
the key question is “What gets produced by playing this game?” 
 
In making these points we seek to underscore that practice should be taken as constituting 
meaning, viz., that practice is meaning. This perspective contrasts with Roth’s comment 
that, “language not only is the result of praxis but also shapes praxis” (p. 45). However, 
we see Wittgenstein’s perspective being that language is [a] praxis (to use Roth’s 
terminology here). Roth goes on to say that, “society produces the activities of the 
individuals that constitute society. Behind word-use is hidden societal praxis, transformed 
and in it crystallized activity” (p. 45). Recall that there is nothing hidden for Wittgenstein, 
as Roth himself emphasizes (e.g., see pp. 30, 34). Thus we find something un-
Wittgensteinian in this separation between language and praxis and this leaves us with 
open questions. 
 
Where can we go from here? 
 
Given the proceeding discussion our concluding provocation is to ask where we can go 
from here while still remaining attuned to Wittgenstein’s thought. As we have cautioned, 
we need to be careful making moves that proceed from the grammatical (i.e., the 
‘conceptual’) and which move on that basis to the theoretical, the explanatory, and to the 
causally practicable. Wittgenstein has drawn a picture of language and meaning, giving us 
a way to talk about language, and from this we can frame our talk about learning, 
teaching, and pedagogy. Wittgenstein describes language, but does not develop 
causal/explanatory accounts of it, or explanatory accounts of why ‘utterance x means p.’ 
Following along with Wittgenstein in going ahead to consider ‘substantive’ disciplines 
like pedagogy – or geography, psychoanalysis, chemistry, etc. – leads us away from 
casually-oriented questions such as “how do we learn?”, which are usually followed out in 
the guise of empirical research, to questions more concerned with describing the signs we 
use and the ways we use them in these disciplines. 
 
Further, what of the question of the determination of talk’s content, once we relinquish 
traditional content-bearing entities such as propositions or ‘thoughts’? In other words, how 
does process yield content? But are these even legitimate questions to pursue in following 
Wittgenstein, the latter question in particular seeming to be causal/productive in tone? If 
these are indeed questions that we can ask, then we feel that we need consider these kinds 
of questions with much care and hesitancy (e.g., see PI p. 232). Part of the motive in 
trying to ask these questions is to reject the notion of ‘independent’ content to which 
language must fit and our pedagogical thinking cohere. 
 
If we concern ourselves with the application of a picture of language and meaning that is 
drawn on the thematic of what signs are used, with the connexions between signs, and 
with how signs are connected one to another, then we have a perspective from which to 
look upon a learner’s developing mastery of the use of signs. The empirical ‘how?’ of that 
developing mastery, or of how a learner (in their particular circumstances and situation) 
comes to connect and find familiar this sign with that sign is, in effect, a matter of 
different, and importantly, secondary interest to us at this point in our thinking. Here we 
are in agreement with Roth, who says, for example, that “science students have to have 
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many opportunities for engaging in language-games, doing and talking science” (p. 48). 
What does matter is that it is talking – i.e., the use of signs in the broad sense discussed by 
Wittgenstein in PI §2ff – that is the focus of our attention. How does one talk, how does 
one know how to go on with signs of interest, are the questions asking for descriptions that 
guide our investigations. 
 
We also leave it as open here for further discussion how we can consider the difficulties in 
representing non-representationalist views of language. For example, Nigel Pleasants 
(1999) calls attention to the dangers of ‘performative contradiction,’ as it is broadly called, 
in just such attempts, i.e., in having to ‘perform’ what one is ruling out in order to rule it 
out in argument (see pp. 20-26). It is worth noting here how tricky it can be to think 
with/alongside Wittgenstein in ways that are consistent and commensurate with his 
perspective on language, but important to recognise as well that Wittgenstein inspires us 
to think in a diversity of ways.  
 
Last, and as has been noted, there are many possibilities for continued dialogue here. 
Certainly, the issue of Roth’s employment of some of Vygotsky’s ideas (and, through 
Vygotsky, of certain Marxist themes) remains to be explored. There are as well different 
interpretations of Wittgenstein that can be taken up in conversation with Roth. As one 
example, consider how Per-Olof Wickman and Leif Östman (2002) analyze the learning 
of science students by using the notions of ‘standing fast’ and ‘immediacy,’ notions these 
authors derive from Wittgenstein’s idea of the standing fast of whatever it is that is 
bedrock in our language (e.g., see OC §§97, 99, 116, 125; PI §217). For Wickman & 
Östman, what stands fast for individual speakers (qua individual speakers) is revealed in 
those speakers’ unhesitating and unreflective verbal behavior in normal conversations or 
activity, and ‘normal’ as given by context. This is ‘immediacy,’ according to the authors, 
which can be picked out in learning discourse – as in any discourse – and contrasted with 
gaps in understanding (see pp. 605-606, 616-619). For our part, we find Wickman & 
Östman’s approach here interesting, opening up important and necessary conversations 
about Wittgenstein’s work. Among other things, we wonder about Wittgenstein’s notion 
of ‘standing fast,’ and the extent to which it can be removed from the context of 
Wittgenstein’s discussion of what is, in a more fundamental sense, bedrock in language, 
and applied to analyze the normal use of all signs. We advocate picturing language by 
taking up and considering the battery of notions that Wittgenstein put forth in various of 
the later texts, such as: ‘agreement in judgment,’ the ‘must’ (e.g., “the hardness of the 
logical must” RFM VI 49), ‘familiarity,’ ‘matter of course,’ and even the important notion 
of ‘going on (in the same way).’ We wonder as well whether the kind of thing being done 
with these notions of ‘immediacy’ or ‘the immediate’ is better captured in more processual 
descriptions of ‘knowing how.’ Finally, and as we argued above, we suggest that there are 
important conversations to be had in getting clear about Wittgenstein’s notions of 
‘grammar’ and ‘language-games.’ All of this, however, points to further work to be done, 
and to aspects of potential dialogue with others in the relevant field. 
 
To bring this response to a close, we want once more to thank Roth for his interesting, 
provocative, and welcoming paper. It offered us an opportunity to reflect on Wittgenstein 
and certain particular distinctions that we find important. We hope that these discussions 
are productive, generative, and helpful.  
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